You run untrusted code whenever your browser loads a web page that uses javascript. With more and more of the web requiring javascript to work, running untrusted code becomes less and less a real option if you want to get any work done.
Arguably, plain HTML is also untrusted code, and I certainly don't trust every single one of the authors of my operating system and all of the os-level utilities and all the applications that I use, especially not Microsoft or Apple. But I'm forced to use them for work.
A year or two ago there was some hoopla about Canonical collecting some information about Ubuntu's users or something like that (don't remember exactly) and a lot of people were up in arms about how they don't trust Canonical. Canonical's reply was one of the most insightful I've ever read on the internet. They said something like, "um... but we've got root".
That's a great point. The makers of your OS, the builders of your apps, they have a lot of power over you that you grant them simply by using their stuff. You're effectively trusting them, even if you don't trust them.
You could react by not using anything that anyone you don't trust writes, or by thoroughly auditing all the source code of everything you use (you do use only open-source software which can be audited by you directly, right?). But this is not really practical for 99% of everyone on the planet.
> They said something like, "um... but we've got root".
Which is incredibly misleading.
Sure, they could put malicious code in their distribution. It could do whatever they want. And then it would be on your machine, where you can potentially discover it and publish what you've discovered and allow others to verify your discovery. Which could cause Canonical to not have root anymore, because people would immediately switch to Debian or CentOS or something else.
But if they send data from your machine to their servers, no one has any ability to determine what they do with it from there, how well they secure it, who they give or sell it to, etc. It's a completely different situation because it goes from trust-but-verify to blind trust.
How many Ubuntu users actually verify everything Canonical sends them? I'd say very close to none, especially for the binaries.
Sure, in principle you could verify. You could read through all the source, you could even disassemble the binaries and read through the assembly (and don't forget to verify the hardware too). Again, who actually does that? Virtually no one.
So the two cases are a lot closer than you paint them to be.
Also, corporations do stupid, illegal, and unethical stuff all the time, even when it's clearly (especially in hindsight) not in their long-term interest to do so. Even when it will clearly destroy their reputation if the public found out they even considered it.
Even if you trust "the system" (which is more of a hope that if there's something malicious, someone out there will detect it sooner or later), there are many cases of vulnerabilities in even open source code going undetected for years... nevermind vulnerabilities in binaries that you don't have code for and who the authors of aren't generous enough to clue you in on.
Canonical (or whatever source you actually get your OS or apps from) could also send you some specially crafted something that no one else gets. Now who's going to verify it for you if you don't do it yourself? How are you ever going to find out, if you're not one of the ultra-paranoid and super-skilled 0.001% of Ubuntu users with infinite time and determination who actually verifies 100% of what Canonical sends them? You just won't. And if you did, there'd be a hundred new Ubuntu versions out by the time you finished verifying even one of them.
People trust, but they very rarely verify. The size of operating systems and applications and the skill to verify have all just grown too large to make it practical for the overwhelming majority of people.
I do see your point about Canonical doing whatever they want with the data they collect. That's certainly problematic. But that doesn't mean that there aren't major privacy or security issues with trusting Ubuntu (or any other OS) not to have malware on it.
Which is not the same thing as no one. And it only takes once to ruin your reputation forever (see also Sourceforge, Lenovo, etc.) Moreover, the probability of detection doesn't have to be very high at all because the cost to Canonical would be catastrophic, so any possibility whatsoever acts as a deterrent. And more so in this context because of the nature of the user base.
Your argument seems to boil down to the position that it doesn't hurt anything to go from detection not perfect to detection not possible.
Arguably, plain HTML is also untrusted code, and I certainly don't trust every single one of the authors of my operating system and all of the os-level utilities and all the applications that I use, especially not Microsoft or Apple. But I'm forced to use them for work.
A year or two ago there was some hoopla about Canonical collecting some information about Ubuntu's users or something like that (don't remember exactly) and a lot of people were up in arms about how they don't trust Canonical. Canonical's reply was one of the most insightful I've ever read on the internet. They said something like, "um... but we've got root".
That's a great point. The makers of your OS, the builders of your apps, they have a lot of power over you that you grant them simply by using their stuff. You're effectively trusting them, even if you don't trust them.
You could react by not using anything that anyone you don't trust writes, or by thoroughly auditing all the source code of everything you use (you do use only open-source software which can be audited by you directly, right?). But this is not really practical for 99% of everyone on the planet.